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Articles by Our Attorneys

Employment Law Update October 2024

November 6, 2024 by MacElree Harvey, Ltd. Leave a Comment

October’s employment law update covers three key cases. Seventeen states are challenging a
rule defining “gender dysphoria” as an ADA disability, citing excessive costs. The DOJ supports
UPMC employees claiming wage suppression through noncompete agreements. Lastly, Cargill
workers won class action certification in a suit for unpaid COVID-19 screening time, impacting
wage rules for hourly staff. See the updates below.

17 States Sue Biden Administration Over New Rule Defining Gender Dysphoria as a Disability under ADA

Seventeen Republican attorneys general, led by Texas, have filed a lawsuit against the Biden administration, challenging a new rule from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that defines “gender dysphoria” as a federally recognized disability under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The group points to the fact that Congress expressly excluded “transvestism”, “transsexualism” and “gender identity orders” from these laws’ protections when they were enacted, and argues that HHS exceeded its authority by unilaterally reinterpreting these definitions.  The states further argue that HHS improperly attempts to distinguish “gender dysphoria” from gender identity disorders, despite similarities in symptoms and diagnostic criteria.

In their complaint, the states further assert that the rule imposes an unrealistic and costly mandate, requiring that individuals with disabilities be accommodated in the most integrated settings, which could strain resources. They claim that for smaller states, fulfilling this requirement is financially unsustainable, projecting costs of at least $560 million annually. The rule also bars programs receiving federal funding from making treatment decisions based on stereotypes. The coalition is seeking a court ruling to block the rule’s implementation.

The case is State of Texas et al. v. Becerra et al., case number 5:24-cv-00225, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Dept. of Justice backs Employee Antitrust Class Action against UPMC

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has thrown its support behind a class action lawsuit by University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) employees, who allege that UPMC used noncompete agreements and blacklists to limit their wages and prevent them from leaving the organization. The DOJ filed a statement with the Pennsylvania federal court, urging Judge Susan Paradise Baxter to reject UPMC’s request to dismiss the case. According to the DOJ, UPMC’s dismissal motion sets an unfairly high threshold for the plaintiffs, which could prevent similar labor market cases from reaching discovery.

The DOJ argues that UPMC’s standards would hinder employees from pursuing antitrust claims under the Sherman Act. It says that labor markets should be evaluated similarly to product markets in antitrust law. UPMC contends that the plaintiffs lack direct evidence of monopsony power, but the DOJ countered that such a strict standard isn’t necessary. The lawsuit, initially filed in January, accuses UPMC of using a restrictive system to suppress wages and working conditions. UPMC, however, denies the allegations, stating that its wages and benefits are competitive and supportive of its large workforce across Pennsylvania and neighboring states.

The case is Victoria Ross v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, case number 1:24-cv-00016, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.

Dept. of Justice backs Employee Antitrust Class Action against UPMC

A Pennsylvania federal judge has certified a class of hourly Cargill workers in a lawsuit claiming the company failed to pay them for time spent undergoing COVID-19 screenings. U.S. District Judge Robert D. Mariani ruled in favor of plaintiffs Jennifer Villa and Susan Davidson, who argued that Cargill’s policy of unpaid COVID-19 checks violated the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (PMWA). The plaintiffs allege they were uncompensated not only for the screening time but also for the time spent walking between the building entrance and time clocks.

Cargill argued that the class was overly broad, citing varied COVID-19 screening times and different plant locations, but Judge Mariani found the common issue of compensability under the PMWA sufficient to unite the workers’ claims. He noted that the core question in the lawsuit is whether Cargill’s policies uniformly affected all employees, making class treatment appropriate.

The class action, which includes over 3,000 workers across Cargill’s Pennsylvania facilities, covers employees paid hourly and who worked 40 or more hours during a given week since July 2019. This certification, according to attorney Peter Winebrake, ensures Cargill’s employees have a fair chance to pursue their claims for wage rights.

The case is Villa et al. v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., case number 3:22-cv-01321, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

Jeff Burke is an attorney at MacElree Harvey, Ltd., working in the firm’s Employment and Litigation practice groups. Jeff counsels businesses and individuals on employment practices and policies, executive compensation, employee hiring and separation issues, non-competition and other restrictive covenants, wage and hour disputes, and other employment-related matters. Jeff represents businesses and individuals in employment litigation such as employment contract disputes, workforce classification audits, and discrimination claims based upon age, sex, race, religion, disability, sexual harassment, and hostile work environment.  Jeff also practices in commercial litigation as well as counsels business on commercial contract matters.

Filed Under: Articles by Our Attorneys Tagged With: Jeffrey Burke

Legal Triumph: Gibbons Secures Rare Court-Ordered Property Transfer

September 18, 2024 by MacElree Harvey, Ltd. Leave a Comment

By: Leo M. Gibbons, Esquire

My client, 4860 Lancaster, LLC (“4860”), was under contract to purchase real estate in Philadelphia, for a restaurant and bar business, along with the liquor license and other licenses, from EP White Horse Tavern, Inc. (“White Horse”) in the Fall of 2020.  4860 was faced with a significant problem because it was intent on completing the transaction, but White Horse took the position that it could terminate the contract and was adamant that it would not sell the real estate and licenses.

After White Horse backed out of the deal with 4860, we sued in the Philadelphia Courts to compel White Horse to sell the real estate and liquor license.  The case went to trial in 2023 and I was able to obtain a verdict in 4860’s favor directing White Horse to convey the real estate, liquor license and all of the other licenses to 4860.  

Courts typically award money damages in lawsuits and only rarely order specific relief such as requiring a defendant to complete a transaction.  In the present case, 4860 was not only faced with seeking the unusual and extraordinary remedy of specific performance (that would compel White Horse to complete the transaction and convey ownership of the real estate, liquor license and other licenses to 4860)  my client also faced evidentiary issues that we had to overcome in proving its case.  Central to the dispute between the parties was whether the closing date on the agreement of sale was extended from September 25, 2020 to November 13, 2020.  It was 4860’s position that the agreement of sale was extended, and that White Horse improperly terminated the agreement of sale and refused to go to settlement.

The agreement of sale contained an original signature from the owner of White Horse.  The addendum to the agreement of sale that extended the settlement date to November 13, 2020 was accomplished via electronic signature.  During discovery, we were able to learn that the electronic signature was added to the extension of the agreement of sale by virtue of an e-mail address that belonged to the son of the owner of White Horse.  Compounding 4860’s problem was that the son could not be located and was never deposed nor testified.  Moreover, at trial, the owner of White Horse testified that he did not sign the extension, he did not have an e-mail and that he never authorized anyone to sign the addendum on his behalf.  

While the son was not available, we were able to locate and obtain the testimony of White Horse’s realtor.  At trial, I questioned White Horse’s realtor, and she testified that the son of the owner of White Horse was regularly present and involved with the sale of the license and real estate because the owner of White Horse was elderly and had very poor vision.  The realtor further testified that she reviewed and discussed the extension of the closing date with the owner (at a time when the owner’s son was not present), and the owner told her that he agreed to the extension of the agreement of sale.  The realtor also testified that owner told her to send the addendum to his son electronically to have it signed on his behalf.  Finally, the realtor testified that following the signing of the extension of the closing date of the agreement of sale, she met with owner three times over the next month to review matters related to the sale of the real estate and liquor license.  

At trial, I also presented evidence of activities that took place after the signing of the extension of the agreement of sale, including that 4860’s realtor and White Horse’s realtor spoke with each other several times a week over the next four to five weeks in moving the sale towards closing.  Additionally, during this period, 4860 was given access to the real estate for the purposes of an appraisal and for 4860’s contractors to inspect the property.  Finally, 4860’s owner testified that in October, after the signing of the extension of the closing date of the agreement of sale, he was granted access to the real estate on four occasions for the purposes of conducting an appraisal in relation to his loan to finance the transaction and also for his contractors to inspect and assess the real estate.  

In ruling in favor of 4860, the Court concluded that a valid agreement existed between 4860 and White Horse, that the agreement was violated by White Horse and that 4860 did not have an adequate remedy at law.  Under Pennsylvania case law, the real estate, licenses and business conducted at the real estate were unique as a matter of law because that same restaurant and liquor dispensing establishment at that definite location could not otherwise be purchased in the market and therefore could not be compensated by money damages.  Under all of the evidence produced at trial by 4860, the Court concluded that the extraordinary remedy of specific performance was warranted and entered the Order directing the transfer of the real estate, liquor license and other licenses from White Horse to 4860. 

Leo Gibbons works with clients involving the purchase or sale of real estate, the leasing of real estate, the transfer of liquor licenses and disputes involving these types of transactions.  The law will often afford a remedy or monetary recovery for when a party is injured as a result of the other party breaking or violating a contractual agreement.  He provides legal counsel to clients in these types of situations and can be reached at 610-840-0227 and [email protected].  

Filed Under: Articles by Our Attorneys Tagged With: Leo Gibbons, Leo M. Gibbons

Upset Tax Sales and the Many Ways to Have Them Overturned

August 20, 2024 by MacElree Harvey, Ltd. Leave a Comment

By: Michael G. Louis

I had another successful year having tax sales overturned or settling the cases after filing petitions to overturn tax sale after the owners had lost them at upset tax sales in 2023.

In one of them the Tax Claim Bureau did not advertise the sale in two newspapers of general circulation in that county.  Unless there is only one newspaper of general circulation in that county that is a clear violation of the Real Estate Tax Sale Act.  If the Tax Claim Bureau does not comply with all of the requirements, and there are many, then the tax sale will be overturned.

I had another one where the owner of the property had died before the tax sale and there was an estate opened and my client was the executrix but she was never notified of the tax sale.  That case settled because we filed a very persuasive petition to overturn the tax sale which was probably going to be a winner if it didn’t settle.

In another one, even though my client did not sign the certified mail, return receipt card the Tax Claim Bureau did not exercise reasonable efforts to discover the whereabouts of the owner of the property and notify her.  Again, that is a violation of the clear mandate of the statute and since I raised it in the petition to overturn tax sale and supported it by depositions the case settled for a reasonable amount.  

In another case, my client had lost his property at a sheriff’s sale for real estate taxes.  In that situation you have nine months to redeem the property which my client did and the court found he did it timely.

I had another case where my client decided that there was not enough equity in the property to fight the tax sale because the amount bid at the tax sale was close to the value of the property.  He decided after consulting with me that he would not fight the tax sale but would just accept the excess proceeds over and above what was necessary to pay the taxes which are paid to the purchaser by the Tax Claim Bureau after any liens on the property are paid in full.

If at all possible, one should always try to avoid the tax sale even if you need to file bankruptcy before the tax sale to do so.  However, if you lose your property at tax sale the important thing is to retain an attorney who knows tax sale law as soon as possible after the tax sale and retain him or her to file a petition to overturn the tax sale.  If the Tax Claim Bureau clearly did not follow the mandate of the statute then sometimes the buyer will simply agree to overturn the sale without any payment being required.  The more normal result is if I am able to find a defect in the Tax Claim Bureau’s process for conducting the tax sale then the case will settle for a lower amount.

However, I had another sale in 2023 where my client was served and knew about the tax sale and had absolutely no defense.  However, we were still able to settle the matter but just had to pay a lot more money.  My client still was able to save several hundred thousand dollars in equity in her property that she would have lost if the tax sale had just been allowed to proceed.  

The sooner you contact me after the tax sale, the better chance I will have to overturn the tax sale.  

Michael G. Louis is Chair of MacElree Harvey’s Banking and Finance Litigation Practice. He has extensive experience defending clients in tax sale cases, mortgage foreclosures, collections and loan workouts, general counsel work and real estate litigation, including landlord-tenant litigation. In addition to practicing civil litigation as referenced above, Michael does bankruptcy for creditors. To learn more about Michael, visit macelree.com/attorney/michael-g-louis, call 610-840-0228, or email [email protected].

Filed Under: Articles by Our Attorneys

Controversial Supreme Court Decision in Opioid Litigation Bankruptcy Jeopardizes Victims’ Settlements – Right or Wrong Call?

July 4, 2024 by MacElree Harvey, Ltd. Leave a Comment

In a landmark 5 to 4 Decision, the United States Supreme Court in the case of Harrington v. Purdue Pharma ruled that allowing the release of the Sackler family as part of the Purdue Bankruptcy was impermissible under the Bankruptcy Code.

This controversial decision invalidates a negotiated global settlement of the thousands of claims of victims of opioid injuries and deaths alleged to have resulted from the misdeeds of the Sackler family and their company, Purdue Pharma, in the marketing and sale of the popular opioid painkiller OxyContin.

Did the Supreme Court make the right or wrong call?

What will happen with the claims now?

Let’s break it down:

What were the claims against Purdue and the Sacklers?

Purdue Pharma was a drug company owned and operated by the Sackler family. In the 1990s, Purdue developed the drug OxyContin, a powerful and addictive opioid painkiller. Purdue and individual members of the Sackler family who ran the company aggressively marketed Oxycontin and downplayed its addictive qualities.

OxyContin became wildly popular and played a central role in the opioid abuse crisis from which millions Americans and their families suffered or died. In 2007, Purdue pled guilty to criminal charges misbranding of OxyContin. Thousands of civil suits followed both by individual victims and their families and by governments alleging harm from the opioid crisis.

It is estimated that the total value of the opioid crisis is $40 trillion, which is seven times the annual spending of the United States government.

What did Purdue and the Sacklers do to try to escape from the claims?

Realizing that the Opioid litigation would eventually lead to their personal financial ruin, the Sackler family began a “milking“ program in which they took a large percentage of Purdue’s revenue out of the company each year and deposited it into overseas accounts and trusts to protect it from the victims and other creditors. It is estimated that the Sacklers milked a total of $11 billion from Purdue.

This milking program eventually drove Purdue Pharma (but not the Sacklers) into Bankruptcy because litigation was mounting and it became clear that Purdue’s assets were worth far less then the value of the victims’ claims.

How is bankruptcy supposed to Work?

Bankruptcy exists in order to allow individuals or companies who are insolvent (debts exceed assets) to receive a discharge of their debts if they offer a “full and fair surrender” of all of their assets.

A Bankruptcy Trustee is appointed to manage the process and the Debtor and its Creditors work out a proposed Plan to be approved by the Trustee and the Court. Once the Plan is approved, the assets are paid out to the Creditors and the insolvent individual or company is discharged/released from all of its debts.

How was the Purdue bankruptcy unique?

The Purdue bankruptcy was unique because in addition to seeking its own discharge from the opioid claims, Purdue also sought the discharge of the Sackler family so that they would be forever released from any past or future opioid claims. In order to justify such a release, the Sackler family agreed to pay about $5 billion(over a decade) into the Purdue Bankruptcy from the $11 billion it had milked from Purdue.

Ultimately, the a majority of the victims agreed to this settlement proposal and the Sackler release. Under the settlement, individual victims would receive between $3500 and $48,000 each depending on the severity of the harm.

The Trustee agreed to approve the proposed settlement which would provide compensation to thousands of victims and their families as well as governmental entities that had made opioid claims and, in exchange, both Purdue and the entire Sackler family would be released from any past or future opioid claims.

Why did the Supreme Court strike down the bankruptcy plan?

In a close vote of 5 to 4, the Supreme Court Majority ruled that the proposed settlement and discharge of the Sacklers was not allowed under the Bankruptcy Act.

In the end, the reasoning was fairly simple. The Majority held that the Bankruptcy Act does not permit the release of a person or entity other than the Debtor who filed for Bankruptcy without the consent of the Creditor.

In this case, Purdue Pharma filed for Bankruptcy, not the Sacklers. However, the settlement agreement provided for a complete release of Purdue and the Sacklers. Moreover, although the Sacklers had agreed to return monies to the Purdue Bankruptcy to help fund the victims’ settlements, they were only returning a fraction of their assets, about $5 billion of the $11 billion it had milked from Purdue.

Ultimately, the Majority ruled that this non-debtor release was not permitted under the Bankruptcy Act.

What happens to the victims now?

The Opinion of the Justices who dissented to this decision is critical of the basic reasoning of the Majority and laments that this decision will be devastating to the victims of the opioid epidemic.

The dissenting Justices argued that a vast majority of the victims had agreed to the proposed settlement and that the Court striking it down jeopardizes any chance at recovery because the Sacklers have shielded themselves by moving their money overseas and placing it in trusts.

It is certain that the litigation will move forward against both Purdue and the Sacklers and there will likely be more settlement talks that may or may not result in a global settlement. It remains to be seen whether the victims will do better or worse then what was proposed in the Bankruptcy settlement.

Tim’s Thougths

In my opinion, the Supreme Court did the right thing.

Bankruptcy is meant to protect people or companies who relinquish all of their assets to their creditors. It was not designed to release other related people without the creditors’ consent. In this case, the Sacklers tried to piggy back on the Purdue Bankruptcy and be released from all claims without giving up anything close to the entirety of the assets that they had milked from Purdue.

The Sacklers should be held accountable for their wrongful actions and forced to relinquish the vast majority of their assets in the event that they want to be released from liability.

It’s unfortunate that victims must wait and fight for more compensation, but it appears to me that the deal that had been struck was not fair to all concerned.

Tim Rayne is a Pensylvania Personal Injury lawyer with the Chester County law firm MacElree Harvey, Ltd. Tim helps injured accident victims understand their legal rights and receive fair compensation from insurance companies. Contact Tim at 610-840-0124 or [email protected] or check out his website at www.TimRayneLaw.com.

Filed Under: Articles by Our Attorneys Tagged With: Timothy F. Rayne

Employment Law Update June 2024

July 2, 2024 by MacElree Harvey, Ltd. Leave a Comment

In June 2024, a local employment verdict created whistleblower precedent in the field of sports medicine, a federal court narrowed the scope of what might be a hostile work environment, and Pennsylvania steelworkers sought to advance wage and hour rights for pre and post-shift obligations.  See more below.

Jury Awards $5.25 Million to former Team Doctor for Penn State Football Team

A Pennsylvania jury has awarded Dr. Scott Lynch $5.25 million in damages against Penn State Health in a landmark whistleblower case in sports medicine.  Dr. Lynch, formerly the orthopedic physician for Penn State University’s football team, alleged he was terminated for refusing to yield to undue pressure from head coach James Franklin regarding player health decisions.

The jury’s verdict, disclosed recently, detailed compensatory damages of $250,000 for lost wages and $5 million in punitive damages against Penn State Health’s Milton S. Hershey Medical Center and a supervisor accused of retaliatory actions. Dr. Lynch claimed that Coach Franklin had interfered with his decisions about how to treat injured players and when they should return to the field, and that when he reported his concerns to his supervisors at the hospital and the university in 2019, he was removed as the team’s doctor.  Despite assertions by Penn State that the termination was part of a strategic reorganization, the jury upheld Lynch’s claims of retaliation and whistleblower status.  Notably, although the complaint named Coach Franklin, Penn State, and several university officials as defendants, they were not included in the verdict because they had already been dismissed from the case in April, 2020 due to the expiration of the statute of limitations against them.  Penn State Health has publicly stated that the verdict was incorrect, and that it may appeal.

Federal Court holds Single Instance of Slur by Co-Worker Not Enough for Hostile Work Environment

A Wisconsin-based manufacturer, Lakeside Plastics Inc. successfully defended a lawsuit brought by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which had accused the company of fostering a hostile work environment and retaliating against an employee. The case revolved around Brian Turner, a Black employee who alleged that a white co-worker, Curt Moraski, used racial slurs and created a hostile work atmosphere, leading to Turner’s dismissal.

U.S. District Judge William C. Griesbach granted summary judgment in favor of Lakeside Plastics, determining that the single documented instance of a racial slur at work did not meet the threshold for “severe or pervasive” discrimination. Judge Griesbach acknowledged that Moraski’s behavior was offensive and inappropriate. However, he noted that since Moraski was not Turner’s supervisor and the alleged incident was isolated, it was insufficient to substantiate claims of a hostile work environment.

The court also examined Turner’s termination, which occurred shortly after he reported the incident. The EEOC contended that the firing was retaliatory. However, Judge Griesbach found that Turner was terminated due to performance and attendance issues, not his complaint. Despite the EEOC’s argument that Turner had received high evaluations, evidence showed he had been late or absent on several occasions, which contributed to Lakeside’s decision.

This ruling underscores the legal complexities in proving workplace harassment and retaliation, highlighting that isolated incidents, unless quite severe, may not satisfy the legal criteria for a hostile work environment.

The case is Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Lakeside Plastics Inc., case no. 1:22-cv-01149, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

Pennsylvania Steelworkers seeking Wages for Pre and Post-Work Duties

A lawsuit has been filed against U.S. Steel Corp. in Pennsylvania state court by James Nadalin, a utility technician at the Edgar Thomson steel plant in Braddock, Pennsylvania, alleging wage violations under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act. The complaint, submitted to the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, claims that U.S. Steel failed to compensate employees for the time spent donning and doffing protective gear, as well as for walking between locker rooms and workspaces.

Nadalin, who often works 40 or more hours a week, argued that he and his colleagues were not paid for these pre- and post-shift activities, despite their necessity for workplace safety. The lawsuit seeks class certification to represent all hourly employees at the Edgar Thomson plant over the past three years, potentially encompassing hundreds of workers.  The plant, part of U.S. Steel’s Mon Valley Works, combines raw materials in furnaces to produce liquid iron, which is then refined into steel.

This legal action mirrors a similar case filed in February against U.S. Steel by an employee at another Pittsburgh-area plant, also alleging violations of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act for uncompensated pre- and post-shift work.  The case is Nadalin v. U.S. Steel Corp., case number GD-24-006878, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.

Jeff Burke is an attorney at MacElree Harvey, Ltd., working in the firm’s Employment and Litigation practice groups. Jeff counsels businesses and individuals on employment practices and policies, executive compensation, employee hiring and separation issues, non-competition and other restrictive covenants, wage and hour disputes, and other employment-related matters. Jeff represents businesses and individuals in employment litigation such as employment contract disputes, workforce classification audits, and discrimination claims based upon age, sex, race, religion, disability, sexual harassment, and hostile work environment.  Jeff also practices in commercial litigation as well as counsels business on commercial contract matters.

Filed Under: Articles by Our Attorneys Tagged With: Jeffrey Burke

The Trump Trial: Why Was Trump Charged and What Should Happen on Appeal?

June 12, 2024 by MacElree Harvey, Ltd. Leave a Comment

The commentary surrounding the Manhattan DA’s successful prosecution of former President Donald J. Trump under Section 175.10 of New York’s Penal Law often overlooks an important historical fact: To date, New York prosecutors have brought charges under that statute, which prohibits the falsification of business records, nearly 10,000 times. Until now, of course, none of those criminal defendants has been a former President of the United States. But the Manhattan DA’s pursuit of charges under Section 175.10 is otherwise fairly routine.

New York’s Penal Law makes it a misdemeanor offense to create a false entry in any business record with the intent to defraud another person or entity. But when someone undertakes the falsification of business records with the purpose of committing some separate and additional crime, Section 175.10 escalates the gradation from misdemeanor to felony:

A person is guilty of falsifying business records in the first degree when he commits the crime of falsifying business records in the second degree, and when his intent to defraud includes an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof.

In other words, mere falsification of business records with an intent to defraud is a misdemeanor under New York’s Penal Law; but falsification of business records in furtherance of a separate crime is a felony.

In Trump’s case, the DA alleged that his falsification of business records was in furtherance of a conspiracy, undertaken with the Trump organization’s in-house lawyer, Michael Cohen, the publisher of the National Enquirer, David Pecker, and others, to skirt federal campaign finance laws. On appeal, Trump will argue that a state legislature cannot rely on a federal crime as a predicate for a state felony. New York’s appellate courts will now have to decide whether this argument holds water. 

As stated above, the relevant passage of Section 175.10 employs the language “another crime.” Criminal statutes are construed narrowly by the judiciary, but the judiciary will apply these statutes based on their plain meaning absent a constitutional hurdle to such an application. Through this lens, of course, “another crime” refers literally to any other crime. And had the legislature intended to narrow the scope of the section’s application, it had the option to include language that reads “another crime under the law of this state,” but instead opted for the broader terminology that appears in Section 175.10 as codified. Trump may find some traction, however, because unlike state civil courts, state criminal courts lack general jurisdiction, and as such are an inappropriate forum to prosecute federal crimes. 

I believe this argument fails, however, because the crime being prosecuted here is not a federal crime, it’s a New York State offense that allows for amplification of the grade of the offense based on the commission of any crime. The Tenth Amendment holds that all powers not delegated to the federal government, nor prohibited to the states, are vested in the states. Thus, unless the U.S. Constitution prohibits the states from passing the legislation that the New York State legislature has passed in this instance to allow for the amplification of the gradation of offenses under Section 175.10, that power remains with the states. And to my mind, there is no basis for concluding that the U.S. Constitution either delegates this power to the federal government or prohibits it to the states. Therefore, New York is likely within its rights as a state in drafting Section 175.10 as it did, and the conviction will probably be upheld. 

Filed Under: Articles by Our Attorneys Tagged With: John Spadaro

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